

CITY OF GULFPORT, FLORIDA

**FLOCK SAFETY AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE
READER SYSTEM**

**REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE PAUSE, INDEPENDENT AUDIT, CONTRACT
REVIEW, AND CONSIDERATION OF NON-RENEWAL, TERMINATION, AND
REMOVAL**

Submitted to	Mayor and Members of the Gulfport City Council
Submitted by	Metria Jones
City	Gulfport, Florida
Date	August 27, 2026

PAUSE THE CAMERAS. REVIEW THE UNREDACTED RECORDS. DO NOT RENEW BY DEFAULT.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I respectfully request that Gulfport City Council immediately pause further expansion of the City's Flock Safety automated license plate reader system and place continued operation, non-renewal, termination, and removal of the cameras before Council for public consideration.

I am not accusing Gulfport police officers of intentionally misusing the system. I am asking Council to examine serious questions raised by Gulfport's own records, policies, audit files, contracts, correspondence, and public statements.

A review of all 34 monthly Gulfport Flock audit files from November 2023 through August 25, 2026 identified (Exhibits G-H):

- 4,805 logged search/lookup events;
- 1,690 events - about 35% - with no recognizable case number visible in either the Case # field or the Reason field;
- 133 entries containing "training";
- 22 entries containing "test";
- 4 entries containing "demo"; and
- searches involving as many as 6,513 participating networks.

The 1,690 events should not automatically be treated as improper. A case or CAD reference may exist elsewhere, may have been omitted from the public production, or may have been documented under a different procedure. But the records raise enough questions that Council should not allow the system to continue, expand, or renew by default without an independent review of the unredacted records.

The central questions are straightforward:

- Was the system adequately reviewed and overseen by City government?
- Were searches consistently tied to legitimate investigations and documented as required?
- Has anyone examined the unredacted logs for repeated searches of the same vehicle by the same user?
- Why did some searches involve thousands of outside networks?
- Who could access Gulfport-generated information?
- Why did Gulfport purchase three additional cameras to regain broader Flock network access?
- Has the City demonstrated that the program's public-safety value justifies its surveillance reach, constitutional and privacy concerns, costs, and risks?

RED FLAG 1 - THE CITY'S OWN RESPONSE DOES NOT SHOW A CLEAR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT RECORD

I submitted substantially similar Flock public-records requests to the City of Gulfport and the Gulfport Police Department. For multiple categories involving authorization, privacy review, operating restrictions, audits, misuse/error reporting, and effectiveness evaluation, the City's response included "No Record Found" or referred the matter to the Police Department. (Exhibit E)

A "No Record Found" response does not prove that no discussion ever occurred. But the records produced to me do not show documented City Council review or approval of major aspects of the program, including original deployment, subsequent expansion, broader network access, data

sharing, advanced search capabilities, retention, auditing, privacy implications, or measurable effectiveness.

What did Gulfport City Council formally know, review, approve, or oversee - and where is the record?

If Council-level review occurred, the City should be able to identify the minutes, agenda materials, presentations, memoranda, approvals, or other records documenting it.

FLOCK IDENTIFIES CITY COUNCIL AS AN APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT BODY

In a May 18, 2026 InvestigateTV interview, Flock Chief Communications Officer Josh Thomas stated (Exhibit L):

“The city owns the data.”

“So city council would have the appropriate responsibility in that case.”

Thomas also said that it is not Flock’s job to police the way police do their work. That makes this a municipal governance question, not merely a vendor-management or internal Police Department matter.

If Flock says City Council has the appropriate oversight responsibility, where is the record of Gulfport City Council exercising that responsibility?

RED FLAG 2 - THE PUBLIC AUDIT RECORDS ARE TOO INCOMPLETE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE OR RULE OUT REPEATED TARGETING

Of the 4,805 events reviewed, 1,690 - about 35% - show no recognizable case number in either the Case # field or the Reason field. That does not establish that those searches were improper. A report or CAD reference may exist elsewhere or may have been omitted from the public production. (Exhibits F-H)

At the same time, the License Plate field is blank in all 4,805 records produced. That prevents an outside reviewer from determining whether the same user repeatedly searched the same vehicle over days, weeks, or months.

This matters because repeated searches of one person’s vehicle have been involved in documented ALPR misuse elsewhere. The Washington Post reported an Indianapolis officer whose searches allegedly tracked vehicles used by his wife and acquaintances thousands of times, and other cases involving repeated searches of spouses or personally connected individuals. (Exhibit P)

I am not alleging that this occurred in Gulfport. The public records simply do not contain enough information to determine whether it occurred.

Council should require an independent review of the unredacted audit records to answer two basic questions:

- Can each search be connected to the report/CAD documentation required by Gulfport policy?
- Did any user repeatedly search the same vehicle over time in a pattern that warrants further review?

The review should look for same-user/same-vehicle searches on multiple days; repeated searches over 7, 30, or 90 days; repeated searches associated with different cases; changing or inconsistent reasons; vehicles disproportionately searched by one user; and repeated searches without a clear investigative connection.

This does not presume misconduct. It asks Council to use the unredacted records to determine whether Gulfport's documentation and misuse controls actually worked.

RED FLAG 3 - SOME SEARCHES, INCLUDING TRAINING AND TEST ACTIVITY, REACHED THOUSANDS OF NETWORKS

The audit records show searches reaching as many as 6,513 participating networks. The files also include 133 entries containing "training," 22 containing "test," and 4 containing "demo." (Exhibits G-J)

Training, testing, and demonstration activity is not automatically improper. But some training activity involved more than 6,000 networks, and some test activity involved roughly 3,900 networks. The records also contain ordinary searches with relatively general stated reasons while reaching more than 6,400 networks, including reasons such as theft, warrant, welfare check, wanted person, fleeing vehicle, and suspect vehicle.

Those reasons may all have been legitimate. The issue is scope. Council should determine what standard governs when a search expands to thousands of networks, whether the scope was necessary, whether supervisors reviewed unusually broad searches, whether training or test activity used live investigative data, and whether narrower training methods were available.

A Gulfport investigation does not automatically explain why thousands of participating networks needed to be searched.

RED FLAG 4 - THE RECORDS SHOW THAT THIS IS NOT SIMPLY A LOCAL CAMERA SYSTEM

The audit files and other Gulfport records show broad cross-jurisdiction participation. Gulfport-specific records appear to reference or reflect capabilities including historical vehicle sightings, time-and-location searching, mapping-related functions, Vehicle Location Analysis, Vehicle Fingerprint searching, direction-of-travel information, cross-jurisdiction searches, and broad network access. (Exhibit M)

These capabilities are materially different from an officer simply observing one plate at one location. A searchable vehicle-location system can potentially reveal where a vehicle has appeared, when it appeared, repeated travel patterns, relationships between locations, and movement across jurisdictions.

I am not asserting that Gulfport currently uses every capability Flock offers through its broader platform. The narrower point is that Gulfport's own records appear to show functionality beyond simple plate capture, and Council should know exactly what capabilities Gulfport has possessed, accessed, or used.

PUBLIC-SAFETY CLAIMS DO NOT RESOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRIVACY QUESTION

The Police Department has cited uses of Flock involving stolen vehicles, missing persons, and criminal investigations. Those claimed benefits do not answer the more fundamental question.

A surveillance system does not become constitutionally acceptable merely because it is useful to law enforcement.

The concern is that a networked ALPR system can create a searchable record of where vehicles have been, when they were there, and how they moved across jurisdictions. When information is aggregated across thousands of participating networks, it can reveal patterns of travel, association, and location that no individual officer could realistically observe at that scale.

That raises serious concerns involving privacy, freedom of movement, freedom of association, unreasonable government surveillance, chilling of lawful activity, and protections embodied in the Fourth Amendment and the broader Bill of Rights. Courts, lawmakers, civil-liberties organizations, and public officials continue to debate where the constitutional limits of large-scale location surveillance should lie. (Exhibits P, S-T)

The constitutional question is not merely whether a license plate can be seen from a public road. It is whether government should be able to collect, aggregate, search, and reconstruct movements across time and jurisdictions on a scale that previously would have required extensive physical surveillance.

My position is that Gulfport should not continue participating in such a system merely because it may occasionally produce a useful investigative lead. Before continuing Flock, Council should determine not only whether it is effective, but whether its use is constitutionally defensible, necessary rather than merely convenient, proportionate to the privacy intrusion, and subject to meaningful independent oversight.

Do claimed investigative benefits justify maintaining a system capable of compiling and searching the movements of ordinary people who are not suspected of any crime?

RED FLAG 5 - GULFPORT PURCHASED THREE ADDITIONAL CAMERAS TO REGAIN BROADER FLOCK ACCESS

Police Chief Mary Farrand publicly explained that Gulfport originally had three Flock cameras and broader access to participating agencies. Gulfport later lost much of that access. Chief Farrand explained that obtaining three additional cameras was the way to regain it. (Exhibit D)

Police Department correspondence is consistent with that explanation and refers to Flock's investment threshold, loss of substantial nationwide access, and later restoration of broader or "all" access. (Exhibit C)

The available evidence therefore indicates that the additional camera purchase was tied to a vendor requirement for broader network access.

Was there an independent Gulfport public-safety analysis showing that the City needed three additional camera locations apart from Flock's requirement?

If such an analysis exists, Council should review it. If it does not, then an important part of Gulfport's surveillance expansion appears to have been driven by the vendor's access structure rather than a documented local need.

RED FLAG 6 - GULFPORT'S HISTORICAL SHARING CONFIGURATION REMAINS UNCLEAR

The records show broad Flock network participation, but they do not clearly establish every network Gulfport officers could search, every agency authorized to access Gulfport-generated information, the exact historical sharing configuration, whether federal sharing was ever enabled, how sharing settings changed over time, or whether immigration-related restrictions were active. (Exhibit K)

I am not asserting that Gulfport shared information with every agency. I am asking Council to determine what the actual historical settings were. Flock's current policies or default settings do not necessarily establish Gulfport's configuration in prior years.

Council should examine Gulfport's SharedNetworks records, Network Audit records, user/admin settings, configuration history, and related administrative records.

Why Gulfport's 287(g) agreement makes this especially relevant

Chief Mary Farrand publicly stated that, while serving as Acting Chief, she signed Gulfport's 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement on February 27, 2025 after discussing the matter with the City Manager. (Exhibit N)

That fact does not show that Flock was used for immigration enforcement, and I am not alleging that it was. But because Gulfport participates in both a broad Flock network and a 287(g) immigration-enforcement relationship, Council should determine whether federal Flock sharing was ever enabled, whether immigration-related restrictions were active, whether another participating agency could obtain and subsequently share Gulfport information, and whether Gulfport Flock data has ever been used in connection with immigration enforcement.

RED FLAG 7 - THE RECORD PRODUCED TO ME DOES NOT ESTABLISH HOW REQUIRED CITY ATTORNEY REVIEW WAS SATISFIED

Gulfport's Charter requires the City Attorney to approve City contract documents and agreements as to form and legal sufficiency. (Exhibit O)

I have not seen records establishing how that requirement was satisfied for the Flock agreements. I am not asserting that the City Attorney failed to review them. I am asking Council to identify the documentation showing that the required review occurred.

Council should also determine whether legal review considered data ownership, retention, sharing, outside-agency access, federal access, exports, auditing, cybersecurity, constitutional considerations, indemnification, public-records obligations, and potential City exposure.

NATIONAL MISUSE MAKES A REAL AUDIT MORE IMPORTANT

The Washington Post reported on August 19, 2026 that at least 69 police officials had been accused, charged with, or convicted of unauthorized misuse of Flock or other automated license plate readers, and that in at least 15 cases someone outside the department first identified the potential misuse. The reporting included examples of repeated searches of spouses, former partners, acquaintances, or other personally connected individuals. (Exhibit P)

This does not demonstrate misuse in Gulfport. It demonstrates something narrower:

An audit log only protects the public if someone actually looks at it for suspicious patterns.

Council should not assume that because Flock records activity, meaningful auditing has occurred. That is especially important when the public version of Gulfport's records removes the plate information needed to test for repeated vehicle targeting.

CURRENT FLORIDA AND FEDERAL SCRUTINY MAKES A PAUSE REASONABLE

The following developments are outside context, not evidence that Gulfport itself committed wrongdoing. They show that concerns about networked ALPR systems have become significant public-policy questions.

Governor Ron DeSantis

On August 26, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis publicly criticized automated license plate readers, saying that the cameras were "out of control," and warned against a surveillance state while acknowledging legitimate law-enforcement uses. (Exhibit S)

Those remarks do not decide Gulfport's policy. They demonstrate that asking Gulfport to pause and review its own program is a reasonable oversight measure, not an extreme response.

U.S. Senate investigation

On August 26, 2026, U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism, announced an investigation into Flock Safety's collection, retention, dissemination, access, and safeguards surrounding its camera network. His letter expressly noted privacy concerns associated with comprehensive records of people's movements. (Exhibit T)

That investigation does not establish wrongdoing by Gulfport or Flock. It reinforces the reasonableness of Gulfport conducting its own review before committing to continued or expanded participation.

Pasco County

Pasco County provides a nearby Florida example of elected officials reconsidering ALPR infrastructure. After a majority of County Commissioners withdrew support for the agreement allowing license-plate detection systems in county rights-of-way, Sheriff Chris Nocco announced that the agreement would terminate effective September 30, 2026. (Exhibit U)

Pasco's circumstances are not identical to Gulfport's. The relevant point is that elected officials can independently reconsider surveillance infrastructure rather than treating continued use as automatic.

FLOCK'S RECENT SAFEGUARD CHANGES DO NOT ANSWER WHAT HAPPENED PREVIOUSLY

Flock recently announced stronger safeguards involving case documentation, auditing, abnormal-use detection, proactive lockouts, sharing, retention, and account security. (Exhibit Q)

Those changes should not be treated as proof that Gulfport's concerns have been resolved. They do not answer whether Gulfport's earlier searches were properly documented, whether repeated-target patterns occurred, whether broad network searches were justified, whether logs were meaningfully audited, or what Gulfport's historical sharing configuration was.

New safeguards cannot retroactively answer what occurred under the earlier system.

The fact that stronger safeguards were later introduced reinforces the importance of determining how Gulfport's system operated before those changes. A private vendor's decision to improve its controls should not substitute for City Council deciding whether Gulfport should continue participating in the system at all.

THE PUBLIC-RECORDS PROCESS ITSELF RAISES A GOVERNANCE QUESTION

The Gulfport Police Department charged me \$227.49, calculated as three hours of Captain-level time at \$75.83 per hour, to produce responsive Flock records. I paid the requested amount under an express reservation of my right to question the charge because I did not want to delay production. (Exhibit R)

I do not raise this merely as a complaint about cost. The larger issue is that the information I was trying to obtain concerns matters City Council should reasonably have already had access to, or should have been formally presented with, before or during the operation and expansion of the system.

That includes basic information about:

- who authorized the program;
- what legal review occurred;
- what capabilities the system provides;
- how widely officers can search;
- who can access Gulfport-generated information;
- how searches are audited;
- what safeguards apply;
- why additional cameras were purchased; and
- what measurable public-safety results the system has produced.

A resident should not have to pay for hours of senior Police Department time to reconstruct information that should already exist in a form available to the City's governing body.

If City Council had already been fully informed and exercising meaningful oversight, much of this information should have been readily identifiable in Council materials, legal review, staff reports, audit summaries, policy documents, or other City records.

If it was not previously presented to Council, that is itself a significant oversight concern. If it was presented, the City should be able to identify where and when that occurred.

Did City Council already possess the information necessary to meaningfully oversee Flock, and if not, why was a resident required to reconstruct it through a paid public-records request?

WHAT THIS SUBMISSION DOES NOT ALLEGE

For clarity, I am not alleging that:

- the 1,690 events were improper;
- Gulfport officers intentionally misused Flock;
- training, testing, or demo activity was inherently improper;
- every broad network search was unnecessary;
- Gulfport shared data with every law-enforcement agency;
- Gulfport used Flock for immigration enforcement;
- the City Attorney failed to perform required legal review; or
- individual Council members are personally responsible for Police Department conduct.

I am asking Council to verify the facts rather than assume them.

REQUESTED CITY COUNCIL ACTION

1. Immediately pause further Flock expansion and suspend new purchases, installations, renewals, integrations, expanded network access, and additional capabilities while the matter is reviewed.
2. Place non-renewal, contract termination, and removal of the cameras on a public Council agenda.
3. Require an independent, City Attorney-supervised, or otherwise objective review of the unredacted Flock audit records.
4. Require that review to reconcile the 1,690 events with no recognizable case number visible in the public records to the report/CAD documentation required by Gulfport policy.
5. Require the review to identify same-user/same-vehicle searches over time, including repeated searches involving different cases, changing reasons, unusually long periods, or disproportionate activity by one user.
6. Review all 133 training, 22 test, and 4 demo entries for authorization, documentation, necessity, and network scope.
7. Review searches involving thousands of networks and determine what standard governed such broad access and whether the scope was necessary.
8. Determine who historically reviewed Gulfport's Flock audit logs, how frequently, and what misuse patterns were actually examined.
9. Require a written explanation of the decision to purchase three additional cameras and determine whether any independent Gulfport public-safety analysis supported those locations apart from Flock's broader-access requirement.
10. Identify all advanced Flock capabilities Gulfport has possessed, accessed, or used.

11. Produce and review Gulfport's historical and current Flock sharing configuration, including the networks and agencies Gulfport could search, the agencies authorized to access Gulfport-generated information, and whether federal sharing was ever enabled.
12. Determine whether Flock information has ever been used in connection with Gulfport's 287(g) immigration-enforcement activities.
13. Require documentation showing how the City Attorney's Charter-required legal review was satisfied and determine what City Council formally knew, reviewed, approved, or oversaw concerning the original system and subsequent expansion.
14. Require a complete public accounting of the program's costs and measurable public-safety outcomes, but do not treat effectiveness alone as justification for continued operation. Separately determine whether continued use is constitutionally defensible, necessary, proportionate, and consistent with the privacy and civil-liberties protections residents should expect from their local government.
15. Preserve all unredacted audit logs, plate information, search records, configuration records, sharing records, contracts, emails, approvals, and related records during the review.
16. Do not treat Flock's recently announced safeguards as sufficient reason for continuation without first examining Gulfport's historical use.
17. Decline to renew or expand the system unless Council affirmatively determines on the public record that continued use is properly authorized, legally reviewed, independently necessary, effectively supervised, consistently compliant, constitutionally defensible, demonstrably effective, and proportionate to its risks.
18. Terminate the agreement and remove the cameras if the City cannot make that showing.
19. Do not replace Flock with another substantially similar networked ALPR system without prior public notice, legal review, and affirmative Council approval.

THE BURDEN SHOULD BE ON THE CITY TO JUSTIFY CONTINUATION

Residents do not possess the unredacted information necessary to prove or disprove many of the most important questions raised by this system. The City does.

Once substantial questions exist concerning authorization, Council oversight, constitutional and privacy implications, search documentation, repeated-target misuse, broad network scope, historical sharing, vendor-driven expansion, and measurable effectiveness, the City should demonstrate why continued surveillance is justified.

The burden should not be placed on residents to prove misuse from records redacted in ways that prevent the most important misuse checks.

ONE-PAGE COUNCIL SUMMARY

FOUR NUMBERS COUNCIL SHOULD KNOW

4,805	Logged Gulfport Flock searches and lookups reviewed.
1,690	Approximately 35% show no recognizable case number in either the Case # field or the Reason field. This does not prove misconduct; it warrants verification against the unredacted records and underlying reports.
4,805 OF 4,805	License Plate fields are blank in the records produced to the public. An outside reviewer therefore cannot determine whether one user repeatedly searched the same vehicle over time.
6,513	Highest recorded number of networks searched. The records also include 133 training, 22 test, and 4 demo entries.

FIVE QUESTIONS COUNCIL SHOULD ANSWER

1. Were all searches properly documented? Can the 1,690 events without a visible case number be connected to the report/CAD documentation required by Gulfport policy?
2. Has any user repeatedly searched the same vehicle? The public records cannot answer this because plate information was removed from every audit entry.
3. Why did some searches reach thousands of networks? What limits govern search scope, including training and test activity?
4. Who could access Gulfport information? What were Gulfport's actual historical network, agency, federal, and sharing settings?
5. Why were three additional cameras purchased? Was there an independent Gulfport public-safety need, or was expansion driven by Flock's requirement for broader network access?

EXHIBIT LIST AND ATTACHMENT CHECKLIST

Use the exhibit letters below consistently. References to the exhibits are already included in the body of this submission. Attach the actual documents behind labeled exhibit cover sheets in this order.

Exhibit	Attach	Why it matters
A	Original Gulfport/Flock agreement or order	Initial deployment, contractual terms, cameras, retention, and cost.
B	Later Gulfport/Flock agreement/order	Continuation and expansion.

Exhibit	Attach	Why it matters
C	October 29, 2025 Capt. Thomas Woodman correspondence	Network restriction, investment threshold, loss/restoration of broader access, and additional cameras.
D	August 4, 2026 Gulfport City Council meeting excerpt/transcript or video transcript	Chief Farrand's explanation that three additional cameras were needed to regain broader access.
E	City of Gulfport public-records response showing "No Record Found"	Civilian oversight, authorization, privacy review, audit, and effectiveness questions.
F	Gulfport Written Directive 444	Department policy governing legitimate purpose and report/CAD documentation for Flock searches.
G	34-file Gulfport audit analysis / summary	4,805 events; 1,690 without recognizable case number visible; training/test/demo counts; network scope.
H	34 underlying monthly Gulfport audit CSV files	Underlying source records for the audit analysis.
I	Same-user/same-vehicle unredacted audit request or proposed audit criteria	Shows the specific misuse test that cannot be performed from the redacted production.
J	Selected broad-network / training / test audit examples	Illustrative rows showing searches reaching thousands of networks.
K	SharedNetworks / Network Audit / user-admin / configuration records	Historical access, sharing, and setting changes.
L	InvestigateTV, May 18, 2026 - Flock Safety cameras help solve crimes. But who's watching the watchers?	Flock CCO Josh Thomas: city owns the data; City Council has appropriate oversight responsibility.
M	Gulfport-specific Flock capability records	Historical sightings, time/location, mapping, Vehicle Location Analysis, Vehicle Fingerprint, direction-of-travel, and network capabilities reflected in Gulfport records.
N	The Gabber, Jan. 27, 2026 - 287(g) Agreement: A Statement From Gulfport Police Chief	Chief Farrand states she signed the Gulfport 287(g) MOA on Feb. 27, 2025.

Exhibit	Attach	Why it matters
O	Gulfport Charter provisions concerning City Attorney review	Legal-sufficiency review requirement for City agreements.
P	The Washington Post, Aug. 19, 2026 - Police departments weren't looking for officers abusing Flock. We did it for them.	National misuse and failure-to-audit examples; 69 officials and 15 outsider-detected cases reported.
Q	Flock safeguard-change materials / Washington Post Aug. 13, 2026 coverage	Later case-number, audit, retention, abnormal-use, and sharing safeguards.
R	Gulfport public-records fee correspondence, invoice/estimate, payment and reservation-of-rights letter	\$227.49 Captain-level production charge and governance/accessibility issue.
S	Florida Politics, Aug. 26, 2026 - DeSantis says automated license plate readers are "out of control"	Current Florida policy scrutiny and surveillance-state concern.
T	U.S. Sen. Josh Hawley, Aug. 26, 2026 - Chairman Hawley Investigates AI-Powered Flock Cameras Amidst Privacy Concerns	Official Senate investigation into Flock collection, retention, dissemination, access, and safeguards.
U	Tampa Bay 28/WFTS, Aug. 26, 2026 - License plate readers to be removed from Pasco County	Nearby Florida example of elected officials withdrawing support and termination effective Sept. 30, 2026.

REFERENCE SOURCES FOR OUTSIDE EXHIBITS

Exhibit L: InvestigateTV, "Flock Safety cameras help solve crimes. But who's watching the watchers?", May 18, 2026

<https://www.investigatetv.com/2026/05/18/flock-safety-cameras-help-solve-crimes-whos-watching-watchers/>

Exhibit N: The Gabber, "287(g) Agreement: A Statement From Gulfport Police Chief," Jan. 27, 2026

<https://thegabber.com/287g-agreement-a-statement-from-gulfport-police-chief/>

Exhibit P: The Washington Post, "Police departments weren't looking for officers abusing Flock. We did it for them." Aug. 19, 2026

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/19/we-found-cops-who-misused-flock-their-police-departments-didnt-know/>

Exhibit Q: The Washington Post, "Flock unveils changes after Post report on police misuse of vast camera network," Aug. 13, 2026

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/13/flock-unveils-changes-after-post-report-police-misuse-its-network/>

Exhibit S: Florida Politics, “Flock off? Ron DeSantis says automated license plate readers ‘out of control,’ warns of ‘surveillance state,’” Aug. 26, 2026

<https://floridapolitics.com/archives/816839-desantis-flock-off/>

Exhibit T: U.S. Senator Josh Hawley, “Chairman Hawley Investigates AI-Powered Flock Cameras Amidst Privacy Concerns,” Aug. 26, 2026

<https://www.hawley.senate.gov/chairman-hawley-investigates-ai-powered-flock-cameras-amidst-privacy-concerns/>

Exhibit U: Tampa Bay 28/WFTS, “Contract terminated: License plate detection systems to be removed from Pasco County: Sheriff,” Aug. 26, 2026

<https://www.tampabay28.com/news/region-pasco/contract-terminated-license-plate-detection-systems-to-be-removed-from-pasco-county-sheriff>

RECOMMENDED SUBMISSION ORDER

1. Executive Summary and full letter
2. One-Page Council Summary
3. Exhibit List and Attachment Checklist
4. Exhibit E - City “No Record Found” response
5. Exhibit F - Written Directive 444
6. Exhibit G - Audit analysis summary
7. Exhibit J - Selected broad-network/training/test examples
8. Exhibits C-D - Woodman correspondence and Chief Farrand Council remarks
9. Exhibit K - Network/shared-access records
10. Exhibit L - Flock representative Council-oversight interview
11. Exhibit O - Gulfport Charter provisions
12. Exhibit M - Gulfport-specific capability records
13. Exhibit N - Gulfport 287(g) statement
14. Exhibits P-Q - National misuse and later Flock safeguards
15. Exhibits S-U - DeSantis, Senate, and Pasco outside context
16. Exhibit R - Records fee and reservation-of-rights correspondence
17. Exhibits A-B and remaining supporting materials

CONCLUSION

This submission does not ask Council to presume misconduct. It asks Council not to presume that a surveillance system has been properly governed merely because the public cannot prove otherwise from redacted records.

Gulfport’s own records show thousands of searches, substantial cross-jurisdiction reach, incomplete public documentation, vendor-driven expansion, and important questions concerning oversight, sharing, privacy, and constitutional limits. Flock itself says City Council has the appropriate oversight responsibility. Florida’s Governor is publicly questioning the scope of automated license

plate reader surveillance, a U.S. Senate subcommittee is investigating Flock's data practices, and nearby Pasco County officials have reconsidered ALPR infrastructure. None of those outside developments proves wrongdoing in Gulfport; they demonstrate that a pause and independent review are reasonable.

The public production does not contain enough information to determine whether repeated vehicle targeting occurred or whether every search satisfied Gulfport's documentation requirements. The City possesses the unredacted records necessary to answer those questions.

More importantly, City Council should not have needed a resident's paid public-records request to learn the basic facts necessary to oversee a municipal surveillance system.

Before Gulfport renews or expands this system, Council should require those answers and determine not only whether the system produces useful investigative results, but whether continued operation is constitutionally defensible, necessary, proportionate, adequately supervised, and consistent with the privacy and civil-liberties protections residents should expect from their local government.

**PAUSE THE CAMERAS. REVIEW THE UNREDACTED RECORDS. DO NOT RENEW BY DEFAULT.
TERMINATE AND REMOVE THE SYSTEM IF THE CITY CANNOT JUSTIFY ITS CONTINUATION.**

Respectfully submitted,

Metria Jones

Gulfport, Florida